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CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT OF INCOME
— by Neil E. Harl*
The doctrine of constructive receipt of income is
repeatedly litigated in large part because there is no bright
line test for when the concept applies.1  Yet the doctrine is
immensely important to farmers and ranchers on the cash
method of accounting.2
Basic rules
The regulations have long made it clear that income is
constructively received when it is (1) credited to the
taxpayer’s account, (2) set apart for the taxpayer, (3) made
available so the taxpayer could have drawn on it, or (4)
could have been drawn upon if notice of intent to withdraw
had been given.3
It is also clear that income is not constructively received
if the taxpayer’s control or receipt is subject to substantial
limitations or restrictions.4
Problems with checks
A substantial part of the disputes over constructive
receipt between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service
has involved checks.  In a 1987 case, a taxpayer did not
have constructive receipt of income as to a check which
could not have been cashed until January 1 of the following
year.5  A case in 1988 held that a taxpayer did not have
constructive receipt of a tax refund check where the
estranged spouse took possession of the check without
informing the taxpayer.6  A 1991 case focused on the issue
of constructive receipt as to a check where the bank had
placed a hold on withdrawals until the check had cleared.7
The court pointed out that steps could have been taken to
obtain the proceeds before year end.  Therefore, the funds
were considered to have been constructively received.8
A 1996 private letter ruling involved a fairly common
practice with checks written and mailed at the end of the
year but not received until the following year.9  In the facts
of that ruling, amounts were paid by check (and deducted)
late in one year but received (and reported) by the recipient
the following year.  The payment included severance pay
and settlement of an age discrimination claim.  The
employer filed a Form W-2 showing payment in the earlier
year.  Apparently fearing constructive receipt, the
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taxpayer’s attorney requested that the checks be reissued to
reflect payment in the later year.  The ruling held that the
amounts were not deemed constructively received in the
earlier year.  The ruling noted that the mere fact that a check
is issued in one year and received in another does not make
the check taxable in the year issued.  Moreover, checks sent
through the mail are generally not constructively received in
advance of actual receipt unless the amounts were made
available to the taxpayer in the earlier year.10
For deferrals of compensation, it appears that
constructive receipt does not apply unless the funds were
made available to the taxpayer, the payor was ready and
willing to pay, the right to receive payments was not
restricted and the failure to receive payments resulted from
the individual’s own choice.11  In a 1996 case, there was no
constructive receipt for future annuity payments in a
structured settlement agreement for attorney’s fees.12
Constructive receipt for farmers
A major area of constructive receipt litigation for several
years in the 1940s and 1950s involved deferred payment
sales of grain and livestock13  In 1958, the Internal Revenue
Service issued a revenue ruling14 permitting the use of
deferred payment contracts for crops.  Other than for a letter
ruling in 1979 holding that deferred payment contracts that
were transferable at year end had to be reported into income
as of the end of the year, deferred payment contracts (and,
since 1980, installment sale contracts for grain and
livestock)15 have been effective for deferral of income for
regular income tax purposes.  The problem, more recently,
has been with deferral for alternative minimum tax
purposes16
However, IRS has continued to maintain that payments
under federal farm programs where an option was provided
to the recipient to accept payment in the year of sign-up for
the program or to defer payment to the following year are
includible in income in the earlier of the year of actual
payment or the year made available to the taxpayer.17
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. The plaintiffs owned
land which surrounded the land owned by the defendants
such that the only access to the defendants’ land was over
routes crossing the plaintiffs’ land. The plaintiffs brought
an action to quiet title to prohibit the defendants from
crossing the plaintiffs’ land. The trial court ruled that the
defendants had acquired a prescriptive easement to one
route over the plaintiffs’ land. The plaintiffs argued on
appeal that the defendants’ use of that route was permissive
and not adverse to the plaintiffs’ ownership. This argument
was based on the actions of the plaintiffs’ predecessors in
interest who had prohibited the defendants from using one
route and had allowed the defendants to use the route for
which the prescriptive easement was found. The court held
that the evidence showed that the predecessors in interest
had warned the defendants not to use any route and had
posted “no trespassing” signs on the route used by the
defendants. The court held that the defendants’ continued
use of the route after these actions demonstrated that the
use was adverse and not permissive. The plaintiff also
claimed that there was evidence that the defendants
consulted with the predecessors in interest about improving
the road and building a bridge on the route. The court held
that the trial court had the discretion whether to find this
evidence credible and that finding was not appealable.
Rafanelli v. Dale, 924 P.2d 242 (Mont. 1996).
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was a three-year-old child who
was visiting, with the plaintiff’s family, a neighbor of the
defendant. While the plaintiff was playing in the neighbor’s
yard, the plaintiff wandered into a horse pasture on the
defendant’s property where the plaintiff was injured when a
horse kicked the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed an action in
negligence and attractive nuisance. The pasture was
enclosed by a wire electric fence but the electricity was not
turned on at the time of the accident. The neighbor had
been specifically warned not to enter the pasture. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant was negligent because
the fence was insufficient to keep the child out of the
pasture. The court found that the horse involved was not
known to be aggressive and the fence was shown to be in
good repair. The court concluded that there was no
evidence that the defendant had not exercised reasonable
care in fencing in the horse. The plaintiff also argued that,
because the defendant had erected an electric fence, the
defendant was negligent in failing to have the electricity on
at the time of the accident. The plaintiff cited Section 324A
Restatement (Second) of Torts for the theory that the
erection of the electric fence was an undertaking and the
failure to electrify the fence was negligence in that
undertaking. The court held that Section 324A was
applicable only where the defendant undertook to perform a
service for the injured party. The court upheld the jury
verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff had also argued that
the attractive nuisance doctrine should be implemented in
Vermont but the court refused, holding that the attractive
nuisance doctrine merely provided a lesser standard of
negligence in certain circumstances, a basis of action
already allowed in Vermont under the general negligence
cause of action. Zukatis by Zukatis v. Perry, 682 A.2d
964 (Vt. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ASSESSMENT. The debtors filed for Chapter 13 and
objected to claims for taxes filed by the IRS, arguing that
the debtors were not taxpayers or subject to the federal
income tax laws (a form of tax protester argument). The
court rejected the argument as frivolous. The debtors also
argued that the assessment was not valid because the notice
was merely a computer printed form without a signature
from an agent. The court also rejected this argument,
holding that the statute and regulations do not require a
signature on an assessment notice. See In re Hopkins, 192
